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Abstract. We derive an optimal strategy for minimizing the expected loss in
two-period economy when a pivotal decision needs to be made during the first time-
period and cannot be subsequently reversed. Our interest in the problem has been
motivated by the classical shopper’s dilemma during the Black Friday promotion
period, and our solution crucially relies on the pioneering work of McDonnell and
Abbott on the two-envelope paradox.
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1 Motivation
When needing a laptop in the Fall of 2015, one of the authors of this article was looking for a
good on-line deal. Benefiting from the advantages of on-line shopping, he acquired considerable
information on the Lenovo T540 laptop price. Two forthcoming time periods were of immediate
interest: the Black Friday promotion from 27 November to 3 December 2015, and the Boxing
Day promotion from 26 December 2015 to 3 January 2016.
Obviously, it was prudent to wait until the Black Friday promotion period, which revealed
the discounted price of 1,431.01 Canadian dollars for the laptop, but it was not obvious at
that moment whether he wanted to buy the laptop at that price or wait until the Boxing Day
promotion. (The price of Lenovo T540 laptop during the Boxing Day promotion period turned
out to be 1,461.60 Canadian dollars, which was not, of course, known during the Black Friday
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promotion period.) Can there be a strategy for making good decisions during the Black Friday
promotion period?
The present article aims at answering this question by deriving an optimal strategy that
minimizes the expected buying price. The idea for tackling this problem stems from the pi-
oneering work of McDonnell and Abbott (2009) on the two-envelope paradox, with further
far-reaching considerations by McDonnell et al. (2011). It also relies on some of the techniques
put forward by Egozcue et al. (2013) who have extended the aforementioned works beyond the
two-envelope paradox. We next recall the paradox itself and in this way clarify its connection
with our current problem. This will also provide useful hints on how we have resolved the
problem and what challenges encountered.
Namely, there are two sealed and identically looking envelopes, with one containing twice
more money than the other one. We randomly pick one envelope and open it. Let x be the
amount of money that we find. Should we keep the amount or swap the envelopes and have
only what we find in the second envelope? The paradox is that if we swap, then with the
probability 1/2 we shall find either x/2 or 2x amount of money, and this gives us the average
(x/2)/2+ (2x)/2 = 1.25x, which is larger than x that we have found in the first envelope. This
argument suggests to always swap the envelopes.
For many years economists, engineers, mathematicians, statisticians, and others have worked
on this paradox, with various competing and complementing solutions suggested. McDonnell
and Abbott (2009) put the idea that the optimal strategy should be based on the information
(i.e., the amount x) that we acquire after opening the first envelope, and then incorporating
additional considerations in order to arrive at a threshold, say x0, that would delineate those
values of x that would suggest swapping, or not swapping, the envelopes. This pioneering and
inspiring solution of the paradox by McDonnell and Abbott (2009), with further refinements by
McDonnell et al. (2011), has been extensively discussed in the scientific and popular literature.
In the present paper we demonstrate how this solution can be adjusted and extended to
solve other problems, spanning well beyond the two-envelope paradox. In particular, just
like McDonnell and Abbott (2009), we also derive a threshold-based strategy for accepting or
rejecting the price offered during the first time-period. Challenges naturally arise, including the
arbitrariness of prices, which are not the aforementioned x, x/2 or 2x anymore. The need for
incorporating elements of behavioural economics and rational decision-making arise. These and
other considerations inevitably introduce additional mathematical and probabilistic challenges,
which we shall discuss in great detail below, and within the context of the shopper’s dilemma
noted earlier.
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The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, which contains our main
results, we first lay out the necessary mathematical background and then derive two optimal
strategies: one when there is no guessing of the second time-period price, and the other when
such a guessing can take place. Section 3 concludes the main part of the paper with a brief
overview of our main contributions. In technical Appendices A and B, we discuss price modeling
and parameter specifications of practical relevance. Proofs of the main results are given in
Appendix C.
2 Main results
We start out by carefully describing the decision-making process, and also introduce the neces-
sary notation. First, the prospective buyer contacts a salesperson during the first time-period.
To somewhat simplify the problem, we assume that there are two kinds of salespersons:
i) those, call them L, who tend to offer larger discounts and thus lower prices XL;
ii) others, say H , who tend to offer smaller discounts and thus higher prices XH .
Both XL and XH are random variables. We denote their joint cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf) by FXL,XH (x, y) and assume that it is absolutely continuous, that is, has a density
fXL,XH (x, y), which is a natural assumption in the current context.
Let Π1 denote the random variable that takes the values L and H depending on which (kind
of) salesperson takes the prospective buyer’s call during the first time-period. Hence, when
Π1 = L, then the price is XL, and when Π1 = H , then XH . Note that for the management
and the salespersons, the actual prices might be pre-determined and thus known, but for the
buyer they are unknown and thus treated as random variables XL and XH following some
distributions, with an outcome of one of the random variables observed during the first time-
period.
Once the prospective buyer learns the price during the first time-period (i.e., Black Friday),
he has two options: to either accept the offer or reject it and then inevitably wait till the
second time-period (i.e., Boxing Day). If the buyer thinks that the first time-period offer is
good enough, he accepts it and the purchasing process ends, but if the buyer rejects the offer,
then he has to wait until the second time-period and then inevitably accept whatever offer is
made to him at that time, because he needs a laptop and the regular price is less attractive
than any of the discounted ones.
Let ∆1 denote the random variable that represents the prospective buyer’s decision during
the first time-period: ∆1 = A if the buyer accepts the first-period offer and ∆1 = R if he rejects
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it. The aim of the present article is to offer an optimal strategy that minimizes the expected
value E[X ] of the buying price X , which could be either XL or XH depending the the buyer’s
decision during the first time-period.
It is natural to assume – unless the buyer possesses insider’s information but we do not
consider this case in the paper – that the buyer does not know who, L or H , is making offers
during the first time-period. Hence, the buyer’s decision ∆1 = A to accept the price offered
during the first time-period does not depend on who, L or H , makes the offer – it depends
only on the price, XΠ1 or XΠ2, being offered, where Π1,Π2 ∈ {L,H} and Π1 6= Π2. In rigorous
probabilistic terms, this means that the probability P[∆1 = A | XΠ1, XΠ2 ,Π1] is equal to
P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 , XΠ2] for all possible outcomes of the prices XΠ1 and XΠ2, and for every
salesperson Π1 ∈ {L,H}. We note in passing that the just noted probability P[∆1 = A |
XΠ1, XΠ2 ] will later define a certain strategy function (equation (C.10) in Appendix C) which
will play a crucial role in deriving actionable strategies that we spell out in Theorems 2.1 and
2.2 below. One may rightly argue further and suggest that in the context of our motivating
problem, the probability of the decision ∆1 = A does not depend on the second price XΠ2 ,
and we shall indeed tackle this case most prominently (Theorem 2.1; also equation (C.17) in
Appendix C)
Finally before formulating Theorem 2.1, we introduce yet another quantity, p(x, y), which
plays a pivotal role throughout the rest of the paper. Namely, conditionally on the prices
XL and XH , let p(XL, XH) be the probability that the salesperson L is in charge of making
offers during the first time-period. Naturally, the company’s management knows who, L or
H , is making offers during the first time-period, but the decision making process that we are
concerned with is from the perspective of the buyer, who can only use her/his intuition or
some educated arguments such as those offered by economic theories in order to guess who, L
or H , could possibly be, and with what likelihood, in charge of making offers during the first
time-period. Hence, p(XL, XH) = P(Π1 = L | XL, XH) or, in other words, p(x, y) = P(Π1 =
L | XL = x,XH = y) for all possible outcomes x and y of the random prices XL and XH ,
respectively. We shall discuss the probability p(x, y) in great detail in Appendix B, including
its modelling and accompanying economic considerations.
Theorem 2.1. When the price of the first time-period is v and there is no attempt to guess
the possible price to be offered during the second time-period, then the strategy that minimizes
the expected buying price is to accept the offer when h(v) ≤ 0 and to reject it when h(v) > 0,
where the “no guessing strategy” function h(v) is
h(v) =
∫
∞
0
(v − w)p(v, w)fXL,XH(v, w)dw +
∫
∞
0
(v − w)
(
1− p(w, v)
)
fXL,XH (w, v)dw. (2.1)
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We have visualized the strategy function h(v) in Figure 2.1 with its properties, modelling,
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Figure 2.1: The no-guessing-strategy function h(v).
and specific parameter choices to be discussed next. To begin with, it is natural to think of
the joint density fXL,XH(v, w) as a continuous function with compact support [xmin, xmax] ×
[xmin, xmax], where xmin is the reservation price from the supply side (i.e., computer technology
company) and xmax is the reservation price from the demand side (i.e., consumer). Hence,
fXL,XH (w, v) = 0 when v or w, or both, are outside the interval (xmin, xmax).
We also expect that under normal circumstances there should be a point v0 ∈ (xmin, xmax)
such that h(v) < 0 (accept the offer) for all v ∈ (xmin, v0) and h(v) > 0 (reject the offer) for all
v ∈ (v0, xmax), with h(v0) = 0. We indeed see this pattern in our illustrative Figure 2.1, where
and elsewhere when graphing in this paper we set the reservation prices to xmin = 1, 400 and
xmax = 1, 600 Canadian dollars. For other specifications, including the underlying economic
theories, modelling, and choices of fXL,XH (v, w) and p(v, w), we refer to Appendices A and B.
We note that under the aforementioned specifications, the point where the function h(v)
crosses the horizontal axis is v0 ≈ 1, 434.43, which delineates the acceptance (to the left) and
rejection (to the right) regions. It should also be noted that the inclusion of the point v0 into
the acceptance region is arbitrary: whenever v ∈ (xmin, xmax) is such that h(v) = 0, we could
very well flip a coin to decide whether to accept the offer or reject it and wait until the next
promotion period. In general, the form of the function is of interest because its lows and highs
tell us how confident we can be when making decisions (accept or reject) depending on the
price v and the likelihood of this price being offered.
Theorem 2.2. When the price of the first time-period is v and the guessed price to be offered
during the second time-period is w, then the strategy that minimizes the expected buying price
is to accept the offer when h(v, w) ≤ 0 and to reject it when h(v, w) > 0, where the “guessing
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strategy” surface is
h(v, w) = (v − w)p(v, w)fXL,XH (v, w) + (v − w)
(
1− p(w, v)
)
fXL,XH (w, v). (2.2)
Note that h(v, w) = 0 when v = w, which is natural. It is also natural to expect that
h(v, w) < 0 (i.e., accept the first time-period price v) whenever v < w, and h(v, w) > 0 (i.e.,
reject the first time-period price v) whenever v > w. These features are of course clearly seen
from formula (2.2) because the functions fXL,XH(v, w) and p(v, w) are positive in the interior
(xmin, xmax) × (xmin, xmax) of their supports. We also see these features in Figure 2.2 where
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Figure 2.2: The guessing-strategy surface h(v, w) (left) and its contours (right).
we have depicted the surface h(v, w) and its contours in the case of the functions fXL,XH (v, w)
and p(v, w) specified in Appendices A and B. The lows and highs of the surface tell us how
confident we can be when making decisions (accept or reject) depending on the prices v and w,
as well as on the likelihood of these prices being offered.
We finish this section with a brief discussion of possible models for p(v, w), with further
details provided in Appendix B below. Namely, upon recalling that p(v, w) is the probability
that L makes an offer during the first time-period, given that the offers of L and H are v and w
respectively, it is natural to model p(v, w) as F (v−w) with some cdf F such that F (0) = 1/2.
In Appendix B, for example, we shall use the beta cdf with identical shape parameters, in which
case we have the equation F (x) = 1− F (−x) for all x and thus, in particular, the requirement
F (0) = 1/2. The following corollary to Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 deals with this special case.
Corollary 2.3. Let p(v, w) = 1 − p(w, v) for all v and w. Then the guessing-strategy surface
is
h(v, w) = (v − w)p(v, w)
(
fXL,XH (v, w) + fXL,XH(w, v)
)
,
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and the no-guessing-strategy function is
h(v) =
∫
∞
0
h(v, w)dw.
The earlier drawn Figures 2.1 and 2.2 are based on Corollary 2.3 with practically relevant
modelling of the functions fXL,XH (v, w) and p(v, w) discussed in Appendices A and B. For
the definition of fXL,XH (v, w), we refer to equation (A.3), and for that of p(v, w) to equation
(B.1). Since closed-form formulas are unwieldy, we therefore employed numerical integration
techniques, which proved to be fast and efficient and thus appealing from the practical point
of view.
3 Conclusions
Decision making in two-period economy has been a topic of much interest for researchers in
various fields, including economics, engineering, and finance. Mathematicians, philosophers,
and statisticians have also contributed significantly to the area. In the present paper we have
tackled this topic in the setup that concerns shoppers facing two price-discount periods and
needing a strategy for making beneficial (for them) decisions. Guided by economic theories and
rigorous probabilistic considerations, we have developed a practically sound model for making
such decisions. In particular, we have shown how to derive, analyze, and use strategy functions,
which not only delineate the acceptance and rejection regions for the first-come offers but also
tell us how confident we can be when making such decisions.
A Background price models and the choice of fXL,XH(x, y)
If the salespersons L and H were in total isolation, their offered prices would be outcomes of
two independent random variables, which we denote by X0L and X
0
H , both taking values in the
interval [xmin, xmax]. It is natural to assume, for example, that X
0
L and X
0
H are beta distributed
on [xmin, xmax] with positive shape parameters (αL, βL) and (αH , βH), respectively, that is,
fX0
L
(x) =
(x− xmin)
αL−1(xmax − x)
βL−1
B(αL, βL)ραL+βL−1
, xmin < x < xmax,
and
fX0
H
(x) =
(x− xmin)
αH−1(xmax − x)
βH−1
B(αH , βH)ραH+βH−1
, xmin < x < xmax,
where
ρ = xmax − xmin
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is the range of possible prices. Given the earlier noted numerical values of xmin and xmax, we
have ρ = 200. When graphing throughout this paper, we always set the parameter values to
(αL, βL) = (2.5, 4.5) and (αH , βH) = (4.5, 1.5).
The observable prices offered by L and H are, however, not X0L and X
0
H but those that
have been influenced by, e.g., the company’s marketing team or management. This naturally
leads us to the background price model, called the background risk model in the economic and
insurance literature, which we choose to be multiplicative (cf., e.g., Franke et al. 2006, 2011;
Asimit et al. 2016; and references therein).
Namely, suppose that Y ∈ [xmin, xmax] is the (random) price that the company’s manage-
ment would think appropriate, and which therefore influences the actual decisions of L and
H . The multiplicative background model would suggest that the observable prices XL and XH
are of the form XLY and XHY , but when defined in this way they are outside the natural
price-range [xmin, xmax]. To rectify the situation, we first standardize the prices X
0
L, X
0
H , and
Y using the equations Z0L = (X
0
L − xmin)/ρ, Z
0
H = (X
0
H − xmin)/ρ, and Z = (Y − xmin)/ρ, and
then model the observable prices as XL = Z
0
LZρ+ xmin and XH = Z
0
HZρ + xmin. Throughout
the rest of this section, we assume that X0L, X
0
H and Y are independent and thus, in turn,
their standardized versions Z0L, Z
0
H and Z are such as well. We shall soon find this assumption
convenient; in fact, it is a natural assumption.
Let, for example, Y follow the beta distribution on the interval [xmin, xmax] with some
(positive) shape parameters (α0, β0). Then the pdf fZ(t) of Z is equal to
fα0,β0(t) :=
tα0−1(1− t)β0−1
B(α0, β0)
, 0 < t < 1.
The marginal pdf’s of XL and XH are
fXL(x) =
1
ρ
∫ 1
tx
fαL,βL
(
x− xmin
tρ
)
1
t
fα0,β0(t)dt (A.1)
and
fXH (x) =
1
ρ
∫ 1
tx
fαH ,βH
(
x− xmin
tρ
)
1
t
fα0,β0(t)dt, (A.2)
respectively, where tx = (x−xmin)/ρ. We have depicted the pdf’s in Figure A.1 using (α0, β0) =
(2.5, 2.5) and the earlier noted parameter choices for (αL, βL) and (αH , βH).
Note A.1. Pdf’s (A.1) and (A.2) can be written in terms of the hypergeometric function 2F1
as follows:
fXL(x) =
1
ρ
Γ(αL + βL)Γ(α0 + β0)
Γ(βL + β0)Γ(αL)Γ(α0)
tαL−1x (1− tx)
βL+β0−1
× 2F1(β0, αL + βL − α0; βL + β0; 1− tx),
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Figure A.1: The influence of Y (dashed pdf in both panels) on X0L and X
0
H .
and an analogous expression holds for fXH (x). These expressions follow from well-known for-
mulas for the pdf of the product of two independent type-I beta random variables (Nagar and
Zarrazola, 2004; also Nagar et al., 2014; and references therein).
Similarly to equations (A.1) and (A.2), we derive the joint pdf
fXL,XH(x, y) =
1
ρ2
∫
1
tx,y
fαL,βL
(
x− xmin
tρ
)
fαH ,βH
(
y − xmin
tρ
)
1
t2
fZ(t)dt, (A.3)
where tx,y = (max{x, y} − xmin)/ρ. We have depicted this pdf in Figure A.2.
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Figure A.2: The joint pdf of XL and XH (left) and its contours (right).
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B Economic justification and modelling of p(x, y)
To begin with, we view our problem within the context of two-period (also known as two-
stage) economy. Indeed, it is reasonable to assume that many consumers who buy laptops
during the first time-period have stronger buying intentions than most of the consumers who
buy laptops during the second time-period. That is, the demand curves during the two periods
have different demand elasticities of price: during the first time-period, the demand elasticity of
price is smaller than that during the second time-period. Considering this difference, the buyers
during the two periods can be viewed as two separate markets with different demand curves
and different demand elasticities, and monopolistic firms would tend to enforce the division of
selling prices during the two periods.
This leads us to the topic of third-degree price discrimination (e.g., Schwartz, 1990; Aguirre
et al., 2010), which in the monopolistic competitive market means that the same provider
would charge different prices for similar goods or services in different consumer groups having
different demand curves and demand elasticities, such as those who buy laptops during the first
time-period and those who buy during the second period. In general, product differentiation
is one of the key factors why firms have some degree of control over the prices, and the more
successful a firm is at differentiating its products from other firms selling similar products,
the more monopoly power the firm has. Product differences arise due to quality, functional
features, design, and so on, and so there is imperfect substitution between products even when
they are in the same category (e.g., Krugman, 1980; Head and Ries, 2001).
Hence, in the case of our problem concerning laptops, there is arguably a tendency to offer
higher prices during the first time-period because the demand curve in the first period is a
relatively inelastic demand curve, due to stronger buying intention. Hence, it is natural that
firms would take advantage of this buying intention and offer higher prices during the first
time-period. Consequently, it would seem that the higher the price is offered by L, the higher
the probability that the consumer will receive an offer from L during the first time-period. The
higher the laptop price is offered by H , the lower the probability that an offer will come from
L during the first time-period. When L and H offer laptops at the same or similar price, then
the probability of getting an offer from L would be more or less the same as the probability of
getting an offer from H . In view of these arguments, the following properties seem natural:
1) p(x, y) is non-decreasing in x, for every fixed y ∈ (xmin, xmax);
2) p(x, y) is non-increasing in y, for every fixed x ∈ (xmin, xmax);
3) p(x, y) = 1/2 whenever x = y.
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We next suggest an example of p(x, y) by setting it to be F (x − y), where F can be any
cdf such that F (0) = 1/2. For example, let F be the beta cdf on the interval [−ρ, ρ] with
ρ = xmax − xmin and equal shape parameters, say γ > 0. That is,
p(x, y) =
1
B(γ, γ)(2ρ)2γ−1
∫ x−y
−ρ
(ρ+ t)γ−1(ρ− t)γ−1dt, (B.1)
depicted in Figure B.1 with the parameter γ = 10, which we always use when graphing.
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Figure B.1: The probability surface p(x, y) (left) and its contours (right).
C Proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
Our goal is to derive a strategy that leads to the minimal expected value E[X ] of the buying
price X , which could be either XL or XH depending on the outcomes of the random variables
Π1 ∈ {L,H} and ∆1 ∈ {A,R}. We start with the equation
E[X ] =
∫∫
E[X | XL = x,XH = y]dFXL,XH (x, y) (C.1)
and then work with the conditional expectation inside the integral. Since the prices are non-
negative, all the integrals throughout the proofs are from 0 to ∞.
Given XL = x and XH = y, the random variable X can take only the values x or y.
Consequently, we have the equation
E[X | XL = x,XH = y] = xP[X = x | XL = x,XH = y]
+ yP[X = y | XL = x,XH = y]. (C.2)
We next calculate the two probabilities on the right-hand of equation (C.2) based on which
of the two salespersons, L or H , is making offers during the first time-period, and also on the
consumer behavior during this period, who can either accept or reject the first-come offer.
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To begin with, we employ the random variable Π1 ∈ {L,H} and have
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y]
= P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]
+P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = H ]P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y]. (C.3)
We next tackle the four probabilities on the right-hand side of equation (C.3), starting with
the first probability.
Using the random variable ∆1 ∈ {A,R}, we have the equation
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]
= P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L,∆1 = A]P[∆1 = A | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]
+P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L,∆1 = R]P[∆1 = R | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L].
(C.4)
The first probability on the right-hand side of equation (C.4) is equal to 1, and the third
probability is equal to 0. Hence, equation (C.4) simplifies to
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L] = P[∆1 = A | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]. (C.5)
Similarly, we obtain the expression
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = H] = P[∆1 = R | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = H] (C.6)
for the third probability on the right-hand side of equation (C.3). Using equations (C.5) and
(C.6) on the right-hand of equation (C.3), we have
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]
+P[∆1 = R | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x,XΠ2 = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]
+P[∆1 = R | XΠ2 = x,XΠ1 = y,Π1 = H]P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y], (C.7)
where Π2 ( 6= Π1) is the salesperson who offers prices during the second time-period.
We now recall the assumption preceding Theorem 2.1 that tells us that the decision to
accept or reject the first-come offer does not depend on who makes the offer – the decision
depends only on the size of the offer. In probabilistic language, this means the equation
P[∆1 = δ | XΠ1 = x,XΠ2 = y,Π1 = pi] = P[∆1 = δ | XΠ1 = x,XΠ2 = y]
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that must hold for every decision δ ∈ {A,R} (i.e., accept or reject) and for every salesperson
pi ∈ {L,H}, where Π2 ( 6= Π1) denotes the salesperson who makes the offer during the second
time-period. Hence, we have the equations
P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x,XΠ2 = y,Π1 = L] = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = x,XΠ2 = y] (C.8)
and
P[∆1 = R | XΠ2 = x,XΠ1 = y,Π1 = H] = 1−P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = y,XΠ2 = x]. (C.9)
Note C.1. Given the description of our problem, we might naturally think that the decision
variable ∆1 is independent of the hypothetical/speculative future value of XΠ2, and thus the
right-hand sides of equations (C.8) and (C.9) simplify by leaving out the second conditions
associated with XΠ2. We shall indeed consider this situation later, but at the moment we admit
the possibility (cf. Theorem 2.2) that some clues about possible price offerings during the second
time-period might be available to the buyer.
With the notation
Sw(v) = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = v,XΠ2 = w], (C.10)
the right-hand side of equation (C.8) is equal to Sy(x) and the right-hand side of equation (C.9)
is equal to 1− Sx(y). Consequently, equation (C.7) turns into the following one
P[X = x | XL = x,XH = y]
= Sy(x)P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y] + (1− Sx(y))P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y]. (C.11)
This is a desired expression for the first probability on the right-hand side of equation (C.2).
As to the second probability, analogous considerations lead to the equations
P[X = y | XL = x,XH = y]
= P[∆1 = A | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = H ]P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y]
+P[∆1 = R | XL = x,XH = y,Π1 = L]P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]
= Sx(y)P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y] + (1− Sy(x))P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]. (C.12)
Applying equations (C.11) and (C.12) on the right-hand side of equation (C.2), we have
E[X | XL = x,XH = y]
= x
(
Sy(x)P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y] + (1− Sx(y))P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y]
)
+ y
(
Sx(y)P[Π1 = H | XL = x,XH = y] + (1− Sy(x))P[Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y]
)
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which becomes
E[X | XL = x,XH = y] = x
(
Sy(x)p(x, y) + (1− Sx(y))(1− p(x, y))
)
+ y
(
Sx(y)(1− p(x, y)) + (1− Sy(x))p(x, y)
)
(C.13)
with the probability
p(x, y) = P(Π1 = L | XL = x,XH = y)
whose meaning was discussed before the formulation of Theorem 2.1. We next rearrange the
terms on the right-hand side of equation (C.13) by separating the strategy-free and strategy-
dependent terms:
E[X | XL = x,XH = y] = x(1− p(x, y)) + yp(x, y)
+ Sy(x)
(
xp(x, y)− yp(x, y)
)
+ Sx(y)
(
y(1− p(x, y))− x(1− p(x, y))
)
. (C.14)
Combining equations (C.14) and (C.1), we obtain the decomposition
E[X ] = µ0 + µ1(S), (C.15)
where the strategy-free term is
µ0 =
∫∫ (
x(1− p(x, y)) + yp(x, y)
)
dFXL,XH (x, y)
= E
[
XL(1− p(XL, XH))
]
+ E
[
XHp(XL, XH)
]
and the strategy-dependent term is
µ1(S) =
∫∫
Sy(x)
(
xp(x, y)− yp(x, y)
)
dFXL,XH (x, y)
+
∫∫
Sx(y)
(
y(1− p(x, y))− x(1 − p(x, y))
)
dFXL,XH(x, y).
Rewriting the latter equation in terms of the joint density fXL,XH (x, y), and also slightly chang-
ing some notation, we arrive at the equation
µ1(S) =
∫∫
Sw(v)h(v, w)dvdw, (C.16)
where h(v, w) is defined by equation (2.2). Since Sw(v) is a probability and can therefore take
values only in the unit interval [0, 1], integral (C.16) achieves its minimal value when
Sw(v) =


1 if h(v, w) ≤ 0,
0 if h(v, w) > 0.
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This completes the proof of Theorem 2.2.
We next deal with the case (cf. Theorem 2.1) when the decision random variable ∆1 is
independent of XΠ2 and thus Sw(v) does not depend on the price w offered during the second
time-period. Hence, instead of Sw(v), we now deal with the strategy function
S(v) = P[∆1 = A | XΠ1 = v]. (C.17)
Consequently, the above defined µ1(S) reduces to the integral
µ1(S) =
∫
S(v)h(v)dv, (C.18)
where h(v) is defined by equation (2.1). Integral (C.18) achieves its minimal value when
S(v) =


1 if h(v) ≤ 0,
0 if h(v) > 0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.1.
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